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6 7	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8	DISTRICT OF NEVADA
9	DISTRICT OF NEVADA
10	R. KEITH MAIDMAN, )
11	Plaintiff, 3:07-cv-0094-ECR-VPC
12	vs.
13	R. HARTMAN, et al.,
14	Defendants.
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16	R Keith Maidman a Nevada prisoner, submitted a pro se civil rights complaint on
17	February 27, 2007 (docket #1), claiming that his civil rights were violated at the Northern Nevada
18	Correctional Center (NNCC), in Carson City, in 2006 and 2007, in connection with disciplinary
19	proceedings brought against him. Plaintiff claims that the disciplinary proceedings infringed upon
20	his First Amendment rights by preventing his participation in certain religious activities and
21	ceremonies, that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated in the course of
22	the disciplinary proceedings, and that the punishment imposed violated his Eighth Amendment right
23	to be free of cruel and unusual punishment.
24	On August 21, 2007, the court granted plaintiff in forma pauperis status, but required
25	him to pay an initial installment of the filing fee (docket #7). The court screened plaintiff's
26	complaint, and ruled that two of the three claims in plaintiff's complaint – Counts 1 and 3 – did not
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state claims upon which relief could be granted. The court granted plaintiff time to attempt to amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies of Counts 1 and 3.

On September 17, 2007, plaintiff filed an amended complaint (docket #10), and on October 19, 2007, plaintiff paid the initial installment of the filing fee as required (docket #11).

Plaintiff's amended complaint is organized in the same manner as his original complaint, with essentially the same claims asserted as Counts 1, 2, and 3. The court has examined plaintiff's amended complaint, and concludes that Counts 1 and 3 still fail to state viable claims. Those claims will be dismissed, and this case will proceed with respect to Count 2 of the amended complaint.

Under the PLRA, a federal court must dismiss a prisoner's claims if the action "is frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same standard under Section 1915(e)(2). Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the Court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam). On the other hand, a complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed *sua sponte* if the prisoner's claims are based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g. claims against defendants who are immune from suit, or claims of

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infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), or if the claims are based on fanciful or delusional factual allegations. *See Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); *see also McKeever v. Block*, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

In Count 1, plaintiff asserts that his First Amendment rights were violated. Plaintiff claims that another inmate prompted the disciplinary proceedings by complaining about activities taking place at the Native American sweat lodge at NNCC. Plaintiff also claims that the disciplinary proceedings hindered his access to the sweat lodge and prevented him, for a time, from attending activities and ceremonies at the sweat lodge. As the court's August 21, 2007 order explained, however, in order to establish a violation of the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, a prisoner must demonstrate that the defendant burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. *Freeman v. Arpaio*, 125 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has made no allegations that could meet this standard. Plaintiff does not say what the disciplinary charges were, and he makes no allegations to suggest that the charges did not further legitimate penological interests. The simple fact is that the First Amendment does not render a prisoner immune from disciplinary charges for all conduct at all related to religion. Count 1 does not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

In Count 3, plaintiff claims that the disciplinary sanctions imposed upon him violated his right under the Eighth Amendment to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. The entirety of the explanation for Count 3, in the amended complain, is that defendant R. Hartman imposed the following disciplinary sanctions on plaintiff: (1) loss of statutory good time credit, affecting the length of plaintiff's sentence, and (2) 180 days of punitive segregation (allegedly increased from 120 days without notice). The court explained in its August 21, 2007 order that plaintiff's claim in Count 3 does not implicate the Eighth Amendment; plaintiff has added nothing of substance in his amended complaint. Count 3 will be dismissed.

The court ruled, in its August 21, 2007 order that Count 2 states a viable due process claim. Count 2 only asserts a claim against defendant R. Hartman. This case will therefore proceed on Count 2 against defendant R. Hartman.

The amended complaint purports to assert claims on behalf of plaintiff, and perhaps two other Native American inmates at NNCC. Those other potential plaintiffs, however, are not named in the amended complaint, and have not signed the amended complaint. Plaintiff R. Keith Maidman is not an attorney; he cannot represent other inmate plaintiffs in this action. This action is construed as an action brought only by plaintiff R. Keith Maidman.

Finally, the fact that the court is allowing this case to proceed on Count 2 against defendant R. Hartman is not a conclusive determination that Count 2 states a claim upon which relief may be granted. After this complaint is served, and the defendant appears, the defendant may assert any available defense, including any argument that Count 2 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. If defendant asserts such a defense, the court will address that defense in due course, with the benefit of defendant's briefing.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Counts 1 and 3 of plaintiff's amended complaint are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In addition, all claims against defendant J. Benedetti are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This action shall proceed only with respect to Count 2, a claim by plaintiff R. Keith Maidman against defendant R. Hartman.

with a copy of plaintiff's amended complaint (docket #10), to the Office of the Attorney

General of the State of Nevada, attention Pamela Sharp. The Attorney General shall advise the

Court within 30 days of the date of entry of this order whether they can accept service of process for defendant R. Hartman. If the Attorney General accepts service of process, defendant R. Hartman shall file and serve an answer or other response to the amended complaint within 45 days of the date of the notice of acceptance of service.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the Attorney General does not accept service of process for defendant R. Hartman, then plaintiff must file a motion requesting issuance of summons for the unserved defendant, and specifying the defendant's full name and address.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the time for service of process is extended to and including November 21, 2008.

Dated this \_\_\_\_ day of May, 2008.